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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ADMIRALTY - Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction &
Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977).
In Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction & Design Co. the
court grappled with two questions: First, is the principle of strict prod-
ucts liability applicable to suits in admiralty? Second, may the doctrine
of comparative negligence (comparative fault) apply as partial defense to
a claim based on strict products liability? The court's answer to both
questions was in the affirmative.
In 1969, Pan-Alaska Fisheries hired Marine Construction & Design
Co. (Marco) to rebuild the vessel Enterprise, which work included
installation of a new marine engine. Marco purchased the engine from
Northern Commercial Marine (NCM), a dealer for Caterpillar Tractor
Company (Caterpillar). Caterpillar had been receiving complaints that
the fuel filters it mounted on this type of engine had been rupturing and
causing fires; therefore it developed a modified replacement filter.
Nine days before NCM delivered the Caterpillar engine to Marco,
Caterpillar sent to its dealers, including NCM, a products letter, telling
them to discontinue use of the old filters and to furnish owners with the
new filters. NCM failed to change the filters on the Enterprise's engine, to
notify either Marco or Pan-Alaska to change the filters, or to warn them
of the hazards of the old filters. Caterpillar failed to determine whether
NCM had done as instructed and did not contact Pan-Alaska or Marco
regarding the hazardous filters.
When Marco finished work on the Enterprise, she sailed. The next
morning the engineer discovered a crack in one of the fuel filters, re-
placed it with a spare modified filter, and watched the engine operate at
idle speed, but he failed to watch how the engine and filter operated at
full speed. A fuel oil fire subsequently broke out in the engine room, and
the ship sank.
The trial court found only NCM liable to Pan-Alaska on a negli-
gence theory and found Pan-Alaska contributorily negligent. As a re-
sult, Pan-Alaska was awarded only half the cost of the Enterprise. The
court of appeals vacated the holding and remanded to the trial court,
instructing it to determine liability and apportion damages based on the
principles of strict products liability and comparative negligence (rather
than on the rules of negligence and contributory negligence).
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The court held that the principle of strict products liability should be
applicable to a suit in admiralty. The court reasoned that "strict products
liability actions have become sufficiently well-established to justify its
being incorporated into the law of admiralty." 1 The rule of strict
products liability to be applied in admiralty law is that stated in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer, or to his property, is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property if (a) the seller is engaged in the
business of selling such a product and (b) it is expected and does
reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1)
applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product and (b) the user or consumer has
not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation
with the seller. 2
Under this rule of strict products liability manufacturers, dealers,
and retailers may all be liable to the injured user because they are all "an
integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that
should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products." 3
Under this theory, Caterpillar, the manufacturer of the engine, is not
excused from liability simply because it warned its dealers of the danger
of the old filters. It is the manufacturer's duty to ensure that his products
are delivered to the consumer in a non-defective condition. The purpose
of the rule of strict products liability is to protect the consumer and make
those responsible for the injury liable regardless of fault.
In addition, the court held that the doctrine of comparative fault
may be a partial defense to strict products liability claims. "[T]he public
policy reasons for strict products liability do not seem to be incompatible
with comparative negligence. The manufacturer is still accountable for
all the harm from a defective product, except that part caused by the
consumer's own conduct. ' ' 4 The court pointed out that the doctrine of
comparative negligence has been applied in other areas of admiralty
law, such as claims involving maritime collisions and strandings, un-
seaworthiness (a type of strict liability), and maritime personal injury
actions.
In using the concept of comparative fault the court stated that "[all
of the plaintiff's conduct contributing to the cause of his loss or injury
can be compared to defendant's liability, regardless of the labels at-
tached to that conduct." The court, however, departed from the rule of
1 565 F.2d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 1977).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402-A (1965).
3 565 F.2d at 1135.
4 Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska 1976).
5 565 F.2d at 1139. (emphasis added).
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strict products liability by rejecting the distinction made in section
402-A, Comment n of the Restatement, whereby the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff is a defense for the defendant when it takes the
form of assumption of risk but not when its form is that of a mere failure
to discover a defect in the product. The court argued that such all-or-
nothing defenses do not distribute liability according to fault and are
thus inconsistent with comparative fault principles.
- S.V.G.
ASSET CONTROLS - Richardson v. Simon, 560 F.2d 500 (2d Cir.
1977).
The Second Circuit decided in Richardson v. Simon that federal regu-
lations promulgated under the Trading with the Enemy Act1 do not
violate due process when they permit a continued freeze on assets once
owned by Cubans and now substantially or completely owned by
United States citizens.
On July 8, 1963, under the authority of the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations, 2 all assets in the United States owned by the Cuban gov-
ernment or by Cuban nationals were frozen. Included were cash and
stock previously placed in a New York City bank by Mr. and Mrs.
Stuetzel, who were citizens and residents of Cuba. Mr. Stuetzel died in
1965, leaving Mrs. Stuetzel as his sole heir. Mrs. Stuetzel entered the
United States as a permanent resident in 1969, and applied to the Sec-
retary of the Treasury for a license releasing the blocked assets. The
Secretary granted a release of half the assets as a transfer of dower. 3
Mrs. Stuetzel died in 1971, leaving her residuary estate to her niece,
Mrs. Richardson, a U.S. citizen.
The executors of Mrs. Stuetzel's will applied for a license releasing
the remaining blocked assets. The Secretary refused to grant such a
license, basing his refusal on the finding that a Cuban national still held
an interest in the blocked property. Under section 5(b)(1)(B) of the Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act, in a time of national emergency the President
may prohibit any use, transfer or withdrawal of property in which a
foreign country or a foreign national has an interest. 4 Section 525(b) was
promulgated pursuant to this section of the Act and provides that "no
transfer to any person by intestate succession ... shall be deemed to
terminate the interest of the decedent in the property trans-
ferred, if the decedent was a designated [Cuban] national." Thus Mr.
Stuetzel, after his death, supposedly still owned half of the property
originally frozen. Since Mr. Stuetzel remained a Cuban national until his
1 50 U.S.C. App. letseq. (1971).
2 31 C.F.R. 515.201 (1976).
3 Id. at 515.525(a)(1).
4 31 C.F.R. § 515.
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death, he still had an interest in the property and there was justification
for keeping the assets frozen.
The executors claimed that the Cuban Assets Control Regulations
were not authorized by the Act and that, even if they were, as applied
they were a violation of due process. The court rejected both claims and
held for the defendant Secretary. The regulations were authorized by
the Act because "Congress ... intended to give the President broad
discretion in administering the Act. ... " There was found to be no
denial of due process in permitting Mrs. Richardson to inherit only the
unblocked half of the assets, which came into Mrs. Stuetzel's possession
after she became a permanent resident of the United States. The court
postulated a reasonable congressional purpose, not specifically articu-
lated by Congress, which would justify this result:
Congress could reasonably believe that a Cuban living in Cuba,
under pressures from the Cuban government, might use his power
to affect the disposition of blocked assets on the Cuban's death to a
United States citizen ... to affect the United States citizen's stand on
certain policies toward Cuba. To frustrate such possible attempts by
the Cuban government, the Secretary could issue regulations which
declare that a Cuban's interest in blocked assets continues after his
death. 6
The court's holding seems questionable in light of a 1965 congres-
sional report 7 expressing concern over the Treasury Department's prac-
tice of continuing to block Cuban assets now substantially owned by
U.S. citizens. The report said such assets should be unblocked because
they could be used as a fund to pay claims of U.S. citizens against Cuba,
and this would be using the property of one U.S. citizen to pay the claim
of another. The court remained uninfluenced by this report.
The court also admitted that the continued freeze on Mr. Stuetzel's
assets served none of the express purposes of the Trading with the
Enemy Act as it applies to Cuba.8 The dissent suggests that there seems
no need to create an imaginary purpose to support a questionable regu-
lation: "The Treasury thus, in effect, by agency fiat, has rewritten the
laws of succession to read that no American citizen ... is entitled to
receive any inheritance from the estate of a Cuban national. This ... is
beyond the power of the agency and [is] a deprivation of property with-
out due process." 9
- Richardson v. Simon, 560 F.2d 500, 503 (2d Cir. 1977).
6 Id. at 505.
7 S. REP. No. 710, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3581, 3585.
8 The major purposes of the Act are, first, to prevent the Cuban government from
acquiring dollars, second, to provide a pool of assets from which United States citizens can
be compensated for wrongs done to them by the Cuban government, and, third, to use
blocked funds for negotiation with Cuba.
9 560 F.2d at 507.
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Another case, involving an almost identical fact situation, was re-
cently decided by the fifth circuit. 10 In Real v. Simon the court held that
there was a denial of due process and that the plaintiff was entitled to
possession of the assets. A dead person could not be a foreign national
in possession of property within the meaning of the Trading with the
Enemy Act. The Government argued that the freeze served the purpose
of maintaining a fund to compensate Americans whose property had
been confiscated by Cuba. The court found there could be no justifica-
tion for denying one U.S. citizen a right to his property in order to
benefit the property right of another U.S. citizen.
Thus, there is a definite conflict among the circuit courts, and a
decision by the United States Supreme Court may ultimately be re-
quired as to the constitutionality of the Cuban Assets Control Regula-
tions as applied to fact situations like that of Richardson v. Simon.
- S.V.G.
INTERNATIONAL LAW - Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., __Del.__
378 A.2d 624 (1977).
Are the rights of shareholders in a dispute over valuation of the
preferred stock of a Delaware corporate utility doing business in China
governed by the laws of that foreign jurisdiction? In a unanimous deci-
sion, the Supreme Court of Delaware ruled that the laws of China did
have extraterritorial effect in the dispute. Even more important, while
acknowledging the rule that "matters of foreign law are determined as
questions of law," 1 the supreme court stated that it is entirely appro-
priate for the trial court to consider relevant evidence concerning the
political, social and economic climate of China 2 in determining whether
to give effect to a 1935 decree of the Chinese Nationalist Government or
to a 1949 provisional constitution of the People's Republic.
The Shanghai Power Company [SPC] had operated a utilities sys-
tem in Shanghai, China prior to expropriation of its facilities by the
communists. Dividends on preferred shares and proceeds in the event
of liquidation were to be paid in Chinese silver dollars or a substitute
currency. In 1935, the Kuomintang Government proscribed the use of
silver for currency purposes and substituted a new currency, the
Chinese dollar, for the old. Devaluations and further substitutions of
this currency over the past forty years rendered it essentially valueless. 3
SPC therefore sought judgment declaring that the preferred stock
was without value. The successor trustee and owner of the preferred
10 Real v. Simon, 510 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1975).
SDel. at-, 378 A.2d at 625.
2 Id.
3 Id. at 628.
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stock filed counterclaims, asking declaratory judgments determining
that the securities were not without value. The Delaware Court of Chan-
cery granted SPC's motions for summary judgment, and the successor
trustee and owner appealed. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed
and ruled that summary judgment was "precluded by factual issues" of
international law, specifically, whether the 1935 decree had been ren-
dered null and void by the 1949 provisional constitution of the new
People's Republic of China, which abolished all Chinese Nationalist
statutes.
4
In reversing and remanding on this issue, the court stated that it
would be proper for the trial court, in deciding which law to give ex-
traterritorial effect, to consider relevant evidence, which would include
evidence of the "political, social and economic climates of Shanghai and
China ' 5 bearing on sale of the preferred securities.
-F.B.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY - Edlow International Co. v. Nuklearna Krsko,
441 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1977).
In Edlow International Co. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko, I the District
Court for the District of Columbia held that a Yugoslavian enterprise
known as a "workers organization" was not an agency or instrumental-
ity of a foreign state under section 1603 of the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act [FSIA]. 2 The court therefore declined to exercise its juris-
diction under section 1330(a) of the FSIA. 3
The plaintiff was a Bermuda corporation 4 whose activities included
acting as broker in connection with sales of nuclear fuels. In December
1975, a Paris representative of a French nuclear concern contacted the
plaintiff and informed it that the defendant, a Yugoslavian utilities com-
pany, desired to purchase about two hundred thousand pounds of
uranium for use as a nuclear fuel. After determining that the desired
amount could be provided, the plaintiff notified the French representa-
tive, adding that the transaction was subject to a brokerage fee of fifteen
cents per pound. This information was in turn relayed to the defendant.
Further communications were held with the American supplier, United
4 Id. at 625.
5 Id.
1441 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1977).
2 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603 (West Supp. 1977).
3 28 U.S.C.A. § 1330(a) (West Supp. 1977).
4 The actual plaintiff, Edlow International Co., was a corporation organized under the
laws of Washington, D.C. However, the company involved in the transactions that gave
rise to the suit was Edlow Resources, a Bermuda corporation. Both were owned and
managed by the same family, but the court held that the Bermuda corporation was the real
party in interest.
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Nuclear, and the defendant eventually signed a contract arranging for
the sale of the fuel. In March 1976, one hundred sixty thousand pounds
of uranium oxide were delivered to defendant. Shortly thereafter, the
plaintiff submitted to the defendant an invoice for $24,000, representing
the fifteen cents per pound brokerage fee. By November, the plaintiff,
frustrated in its efforts to obtain payment, brought this suit. The defen-
dant moved for a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the district court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction.
Section 1330 of the FSIA provides that district courts shall have
original jurisdiction "without regard to amount in controversy of any
nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of
this title. ... " Section 1603(a) defines a foreign state as including an
"agency or instrumentality of a foreign state .... " To qualify as an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, an entity must meet the
three criteria set forth in section 1603(b): (1) it must be "a separate legal
person, corporate or otherwise;" (2) it must be an "organ of a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof;" and (3) it must not be a citizen of
the United States or organized under the laws of any nation except the
foreign state in question. The court found that the defendant clearly
satisfied the first and third criteria listed above. The crucial issue, there-
fore, was whether a workers organization in Yugoslavia is an "organ" of
the Yugoslavian state or is owned by the state or a subdivision thereof.
Plaintiff argued that since Yugoslavia is a socialist country, all prop-
erty under its jurisdiction is ultimately owned by the state. On the basis
of this premise, plaintiff argued that defendant and all Yugoslavian
workers organizations are owned by the state and therefore come within
section 1603(b)(2). The Yugoslavian constitution defines a workers or-
ganization as "an independent self-managing organization of workers
linked in labour by common interests and organized in basic organiza-
tion of associated labour. ... ,, Defendant argued that the property it
owned was "social property" which was neither state-owned nor pri-
vately owned, but rather "held and used 'in trust' by the work organiza-
tion for the general social good of all the Yugoslav people." 6
While recognizing that Congress intended that section 1603(b) be
read broadly to include a variety of forms, the court rejected plaintiff's
contentions, by saying that "to accept plaintiff's argument on this point
would be to characterize virtually every enterprise operated under a
socialist system as an instrumentality of the state .... 7 The court noted
also that the Yugoslavian government did not subsidize defendant, that
defendant's daily operations were virtually free of direct government
control, and that the government held no seats on defendant's board of
directors.
5 441 F. Supp. at 831.
6 Id.
7 Id.
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The court's ruling was based largely on the Yugoslavian definition
of a workers organization. Yugoslavia is unique and an argument can be
made that it, more than any other socialist nation, allows individual
enterprise to exist. Nevertheless, socialism implies total government
control, and though this workers organization may have had a great
deal of autonomy, it is difficult to imagine that it existed without direct
approval of the Yugoslavian government.
-D.M.
SHIPPING - Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. California Stevedore &
Ballast Co., 559 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1977).
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act [COGSA]1 limits the liability of
ocean carriers to five hundred dollars for loss or damage in connection
with transportation unless the nature and value of such goods have been
declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of
lading. The dispute at issue in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v.
California Stevedore & Ballast Co. arose when a carrier attempted to limit
its liability in all cases to five hundred dollars through the use of a bill of
lading which contained "no space for an excess valuation declaration"
and therefore on its face provided "no opportunity for the shipper to
declare a higher value." 2
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that such a
practice could not limit liability because it does not allow the shipper a
fair opportunity to declare a higher value for the cargo and to pay a
correspondingly higher charge.3 The court held that California Steve-
dore's bill of lading did not allow this fair opportunity to declare a higher
value. It was therefore inconsistent with the purpose of COGSA and
could not take effect. The court rejected the carrier's assertions that Pan
Am could have avoided the limitation through insertion of a higher
valuation, even though such opportunity did not present itself on the
face of the bill of lading. The court emphasized that a bill of lading is a
boilerplate form drafted by the carrier, and is "presented for acceptance
as a matter of routine business practice to a relatively low-level shipper
employee." ' 4 It is commercially unrealistic to impute knowl-
edge of COGSA liability limitations to such an employee. The court
therefore placed on the carrier the burden of proving that an opportun-
ity did in fact exist for the shipper to avoid the limitation. Since Califor-
nia Stevedore did not carry this burden, the limitation of liability was
disallowed.
1 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, § let seq., 46 U.S.C. § 1300 et seq. (1970).
2 559 F.2d 1173, 1176 (1977).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 1177.
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Judicial recognition of the legislative history of COGSA buttressed
the decision. Congress passed the Act in 1939 precisely to counteract the
persistent attempts of carriers who sought to escape liability through
all-embracing exceptions in their ocean bills of lading.5
-F.B.
IMPORTS -Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. 3d 180, 571
P.2d 254, 141 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977).
The California Supreme Court recently held that the City and
County of Los Angeles could impose on a foreign carrier an ad valorem
personal property tax on cargo shipping containers used exclusively in
foreign commerce. The court upheld the levy even though the same
containers were also taxed in Japan. None of the containers were ever
continuously present in the state, because each container was constantly
in transit.
The plaintiffs were six foreign shipping lines which had their
domiciles and principal places of business in Japan. Each container re-
mained within the jurisdiction of the city and county for a period averag-
ing less than three weeks, although a certain number of different ones
were always present. The containers were taxed according to the
number continuously present, ostensibly in payment for the plaintiffs'
use of county services.
In upholding the defendants' right to tax the cargo containers, the
court relied upon a recent California case involving similar facts, Sea-
Land Service, Inc. v. County of Almeda. 1 In Sea-Land the California Sup-
reme Court upheld the county's right to tax a domestic corporation's
cargo shipping containers which were used in both interstate and
foreign commerce. Those containers were within the local jurisdiction
on the same transitory basis as the ones in Japan Line. 2 The shipping
lines in the present case attempted to distinguish Sea-Land on the basis
that those containers were owned by a domestic corporation concededly
subject to local taxation in the United States, while here the owners were
foreign-based. The court, however, rejected this distinction and applied
the reasoning of Sea-Land to the present facts.
The home-port doctrine, as first applied in the Sea-Land decision,
states that foreign airplanes and oceangoing ships engaged in foreign
commerce may not be taxed by any jurisdiction except that of their home
port.3 This doctrine had been extended to foreign commerce by the
5 Id. at 1174.
1 12 Cal. 3d 772, 528 P.2d 56, 117 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1974).
2 Id. at 776, 528 P.2d at 58-59, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 450-51.
3 Id. at 782, 528 P.2d at 63, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 455.
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California Supreme Court in Scandanavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County
of Los Angeles. 4 The plaintiffs in Japan Line argued that this doctrine
precluded taxation of the containers by any other jurisdiction other than
Japan. The court in Japan Line, however, adopted a highly restrictive
view of the home-port doctrine.
The court in S.A.S. distinguished situations involving foreign com-
merce from those involving interstate commerce. With respect to foreign
trade it held that local governments "must confine themselves to a levy
on an apportioned basis, related to time or use within that jurisdiction,
... in order that the total taxes so assessed shall not amount to more
than one single ad valorem basis. ' 5 However, the court in Japan Line
limited the S.A.S. decision to situations in which foreign airplanes and
ships have insufficient contacts with the local jurisdiction. As support
for its decision the court noted the series of U.S. Supreme Court cases
which adopt the apportionment doctrine for taxing instrumentalities of
interstate commerce. The court's extension of the Sea-Land rule and its
restriction of S.A. S. were further demonstrated by its adoption of Justice
Traynor's dissent in S.A.S., which stated that "the threat of double
taxation from foreign taxing authorities has no role in commerce clause
considerations of multiple burdens ....- 6
The court similarly dispensed with the plaintiff's other contentions
and found that taxation by the defendant municipalities did not violate
the prohibition against the states imposing tonnage duties found in
Article I of the U.S. Constitution. Supporting this conclusion is the U.S.
Supreme Court's opinion in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 7 which held
that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax imposed by a state on
imported as well as domestic tires is not an "impost" or "duty" on
imports within the purpose of the constitutional prohibition.8 Moreover,
the Court also authorized the imposition of personal property taxes on
such instrumentalities of interstate commerce as railroad cars, so long as
the taxes are apportioned according to the length of time the instrumen-
talities are found within the state's jurisdiction. 9
The court in Japan Line did not consider the most favored nation
provision in the 1953 treaty between the United States and Japan to
be controlling. In the S.A.S. case, the court held that a similar most
favored nation provision in a 1939 convention between the United
States and Sweden prevented Los Angeles County from taxing Swedish-
owned property, including airplanes. In Japan Line, however, the court
refused to extend the S.A.S. holding to cover cargo containers.
-W.H.
4 56 Cal. 2d 11, 363 P.2d 25, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1961) [hereinafter referred to as S.A.S. I
I Id. at 31, 363 P.2d at 37, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
6 20 Cal. 3d at 185, 571 P.2d at 257, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
7 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
8 Id. at 283-94.
9 Pullman's Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
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INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT - Chandler v. Jet Air Freight, Inc.,
54 Ill. App.3d 1005, 370 N.E.2d 95 (1977).
Parties shipping freight by international air transport may be denied
recovery for the carrier's loss of their goods in transit either by the two
year period of limitations in the Warsaw Convention1 or by the claim
procedures in the the Civil Aeronautics Board's International Airfreight
Rates Tariff. So held the Illinois Court of Appeals in Chandler v. Jet Air
Freight, Inc., 2 which involved a customer's suit against an air carrier for
loss of cargo to be shipped to Jamaica, West Indies. The court held that
the suit was barred by both regulations; the Warsaw Convention con-
trols since the transportation was between two contracting parties to the
convention, and the C.A.B. tariff provisions apply since the carrier had
filed the tariff with the C.A.B.
Here the plaintiffs had contracted with defendant Jet Air Freight,
Inc. in September 1970 to have certain cargo transported from Chicago
to Jamaica. While the carrier held the goods in Miami pending receipt of
plaintiff's payment, the cargo was lost or misplaced. The plaintiffs did
not file suit until June 1974, although they had become aware that the
freight never reached Jamaica shortly after the goods were sent.
In applying the Warsaw Convention to the present facts, the court
was relying on solid precedent. Although the cargo never actually left
the country, Article 1 of the Convention states that the document's
provisions "apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the
parties" as long as the contract provides for transportation between
Convention signatories. 3 Article 29 provides that the two-year statute of
limitations runs from the date that either the aircraft ought to have
arrived at its destination or the transportation stopped. The case of
Molitch v. Irish International Airlines4 supports the proposition that this
limitation is absolute and is not subject to any requirement that the
customer be expressly warned of any rules limiting liability under the
Convention.5
The holding in Chandler would appear to be entirely consistent with
the two stated purposes of the original Convention. The short statute of
limitations was an important part of the attempt to achieve uniformity in
the procedures for dealing with claims arising in international air traffic
I A Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, concluded at Warsaw, Oct. 12, 1929; entered into force for the U.S. Oct.
29, 1934, subject to a reservation, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1502
(1970).
2 54 Il. App. 3d 1005, 370 N.E.2d 95 (1977).
3 Butz v. British Airways, 421 F. Supp. 127, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
4 436 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1970).
5 Id. at 44. Although Molitch involved passenger tickets and the requirements of
Article 3(1)(e), it is easily extended to encompass the cargo in the present facts by Article
8(q).
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and in the substantive law applicable to these claims. 6 Similarly, the
court's decision conforms with the Convention's principal goal of limit-
ing the carrier's potential liability from such claims. 7
Apart from the terms of the Convention, the court held that other
grounds for barring plaintiffs' relief existed in the C.A.B. tariff provi-
sions. Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,8 all air carriers are re-
quired to file with the C.A.B. tariffs stating fares, rules and regulations
concerning their operation. 9 A long line of authority has held that such a
tariff, once filed, "becomes an integral part of the contract between the
carrier and the shipper," and "if valid, are conclusive and exclusive" in
governing the rights and liabilities of the parties. 10 Since the defendant
carrier in the present case had filed International Airfreight Rates Tariff
No. 3 with the C.A.B., the claim procedure of this tariff controlled.
Under this procedure, plaintiffs had failed to make their claim in writing
within 120 days of the carrier's acceptance of the shipment, and thus
their claim was denied.
The federal courts have also considered the problem of limitations
on liability contained in the tariffs. A ceiling on the value of claims was
upheld in Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., in which the court stated that the
Federal Aviation Act does not prohibit exculpatory clauses contained in
the tariffs, if valid and accepted by the C.A.B." Another court has
similarly held that such limitations on liability are binding on the ship-
ping customers regardless of whether the restrictions are stated in the
transportation documents. 12
-W.H.
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS - Agreement Between the United
States and Canada on Principles Applicable to a Northern
Natural Gas Pipeline, printed in DECISION AND REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE ALASKA NATURAL GAS TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEM, Executive Office of the President, September 1977.
On September 20, 1977 the United States and Canada signed the
Agreement on Principles Applicable to a Northern Natural Gas Pipeline,
initiating a project which promises to be one of the largest privately
financed international business ventures of all time. The Agreement
provides certain assurances on the questions of routes, taxation levels,
6 Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 497, 498-99 (1967).
7 Id. at 499.
8 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1970).
9 Id. at § 1373(a).
10 Randall v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 840, 845 (W.D. Ark. 1975).
:1 Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 360, 365 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
12 Randall v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., supra note 10.
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project delays and other matters, and, with the Transit Pipeline Treaty
protects the project from charges that would threaten the intended
savings to U.S. consumers.
Under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act, Congress authorized the Pres-
ident to determine whether Canada would permit construction of a
natural gas pipeline across Canada and to negotiate intergovernmental
agreements to that end. Accordingly, the President's Decision and Re-
port to Congress on the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System' was
submitted to Congress and was approved by joint resolution on October
12, 1977.2 The system finally approved had been proposed by the Alcan
Pipeline Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Northwest Pipeline
Corporation. The route will parallel existing utility corridors southward
from Prudhoe Bay through the Yukon Territory, British Columbia,
Alberta and Saskatchewan, and then to the U.S. markets.
As construction will be privately financed, the companies owning
the pipeline will have to demonstrate to the government having jurisdic-
tion that adequate protections against the risk of non-completion and
interruption have been taken before construction is allowed to begin.
Both governments will use a variable rate of return on each company's
equity investment as an incentive for minimizing costs. Thus the burden
of cost increases will be carried by the companies' stockholders, not
passed on in increased user fees to the owners of the gas shipped
through the pipeline. This will insulate the consumer to some degree
from the effects of cost overruns in project construction. 3
The Agreement also includes provisions to ensure non-
discriminatory taxation by the affected Canadian provinces. British
Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan annexed endorsements to the
Agreement, assuring the federal governments that no more taxes or fees
will be charged against the Alcan pipeline than those levied on any other
within their boundaries. As there are currently no similar pipelines in
the Yukon Territory, ad valorem property taxation was negotiated as a
part of the Agreement. The agreed rate of taxation in the Yukon is
comparable to that levied on the part of the pipeline within Alaska. It
will remain unchanged for twenty-five years unless another similar
pipeline is built or unless Alaska alters its present rates. If another
pipeline is constructed in the Yukon, the non-discriminatory arrange-
ment now applying in the provinces will replace the Alaska-based rate.4
The provisions also cover any future payments due for either im-
pact assistance or native claims. The Canadian government has assured
I EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DECISION AND REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
ALASKA NATURAL GAS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM (1977) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
2 H.R.J. Res. 621, 95th Cong. 1st Sess., (1977).
3 Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada on Principles Appli-
cable to a Northern National Gas Pipeline, 5 [hereinafter cited as Agreement] reprinted in
REPORT, supra note 1, at 50-51 with explanation at 248-49.
4 Agreement, 5 reprinted in REPORT, supra note 1, at 51-56.
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the United States that no charges for native claims will be levied against
the pipeline. It regards native claims settlements as a purely domestic
matter, and will not follow the precedent set by the assessment of native
claims against the Alaskan segment of the pipeline. To compensate for
the pipeline's socioeconomic impact, the Canadian National Energy
Board (NEB) had recommended a $200 million impact assistance pay-
ment to the Yukon. However, a plan has been arranged so that advance
payment by the company will be treated as a loan to the government, to
be paid back through reduction of future property tax liabilities. This
arrangement will not affect the cost of service to U.S. consumers.5
A further concern of the parties was the possible effect on the
"Canadian content" regulations issued by the NEB. Intended to ensure
that Canadian firms and workers receive maximum economic benefit
from pipeline projects in Canada, the regulations could have increased
costs. The Agreement, however, commits each government to the prin-
ciple that the supply of goods and services will be on a competitive
basis. If either party concludes that this principle is not being followed,
it may consult with the other government to consider remedies,
including the renegotiation of contracts or reopening of bids. 6
-W.H.
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS PRACTICES - International Chamber
of Commerce, Commission on Ethical Practices, Draft Report on
Ethical Practices in Commercial Transactions, ICC Doc. 192/36
(1977), 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 686 (1977).
Recent disclosures of corruption in international transactions have
prompted both governments and the international business community
to consider methods of combatting corrupt practices. One such effort is
that undertaken by the International Chamber of Commerce. In De-
cember 1975, it set up an ad hoc commission to investigate the extent of
corrupt business practices and to suggest a solution to the problem. In
March 1977, the commission produced a Draft Report on Ethical Prac-
tices. The Drafting Committee concluded that "complementary and
mutually reinforcing efforts at the national and international levels by
both government and business" are required to combat the problem.'
The committee therefore proposed stringent laws in all countries pro-
hibiting commercial corruption and providing administrative machinery
necessary for enforcement.
5 Agreement, 5(b)(ix) reprinted in REPORT at 56-57 with explanation at 241-42.
6 Agreement, 7 reprinted in REPORT at 60-61 with explanation at 242-43.
1 Foreword to the Commission on Ethical Practices Draft Report on Ethical Practices in
Commercial Transactions, 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 686, 687 (1977).
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The Draft is divided into two sections. Part I consists of recom-
mendations to individual governments, and Part II sets forth the
International Code on Ethical Practices. Part I proposes that national
governments set up strict procedures to monitor financial transactions
between government officials and corporate enterprises, and between
corporations themselves. It suggests that this could be accomplished
through the use of surveillance and investigation by law enforcement
agencies. An independent audit of all companies enjoying limited
liability would complement these enforcement measures. On the inter-
national level, the Draft proposes that states should adopt an
international treaty providing for international cooperation and judicial
assistance in dealing with corrupt practices. Specific proposals focus
upon cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of offenders.
Part II is the actual Code on Ethical Practices, which promulgates
standards and rules of good behavior for business. The Code relies upon
voluntary compliance to promote integrity in commercial transactions. 2
The fourteen Articles proscribe the making, solicitation or acceptance of
corrupt payments and kickbacks. Several rules cover the conduct of
corporate and government agents. The Articles recommend semi-public
disclosure of financial accounts, and couple the recommendation with a
suggestion that an independent audit verify the accuracy of the ac-
counts. Additional provisions provide for the public disclosure of any
conflict of interest or related information.
The Committee also recommends that a model contract clause cov-
ering ethical practices be included in contracts between enterprises, as
well as in contracts between enterprises and public bodies. The clause
requires strict observance of the Code, and specifies that violations
thereof enable the innocent party to terminate the contract or to recover
the full value of the offer plus any consequential damages that may
arise.
The Draft lastly provides for an implementing "Council" composed
of geographically diverse members with legal and business
backgrounds. In applying the Code, the Council would be entitled to
investigate any violation of the Code and recommend to national au-
thorities the appropriate civil or criminal proceedings. The Council also
could give advisory opinions on the interpretation of the Code to courts
of law or any other public authorities.
-F.B.
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT - Recent Developments at the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes was
created in 1966 as a permanent impartial facility to resolve investment
2 Id. at 693.
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disputes between host countries and foreign investors through concilia-
tion and arbitration proceedings. The Convention which established the
Centre was formulated by World Bank officials in order to encourage
private foreign investment in less developed countries by reducing the
risk and uncertainty of such investments.1 Both the host country and the
country of which the investor is a national must have signed the Con-
vention in order for the Centre to have jurisdiction over the dispute. As
of January 3, 1978, seventy-three states had signed the Convention and
sixty-nine had deposited instruments of ratification. 2
Despite certain advantages which the Centre offers the private in-
vestor, its effectiveness has been limited. The primary advantage of the
Centre is that it "affords private persons and corporations the only insti-
tutionalized international forum for litigating with States." 3 However,
during the Centre's twelve year existence only eight cases have been
submitted to its facilities for arbitration. The explanation for the Centre's
lack of effectiveness seems to be twofold. First, no Central or South
American states have signed the Convention. The Latin American op-
position to the convention is based on the strongly held concepts of
sovereignty embodied in the Calvo Doctrine and peculiar to that part of
the world. 4 This eliminates a particularly volatile and important area of
the Third World from the Centre's jurisdiction. Second, a 1973 study of
Fortune 1,000 firms revealed that managements of the responding firms
were wary of utilizing the services of a new organization which had no
track record. 5 Many respondents also expressed unfamiliarity with the
Centre and its procedures.
On January 1, 1977, none of the first five arbitration cases brought
before the Centre had been disposed of. The oldest had been registered
on December 24, 1971, and the newest on June 21, 1974. During early
1977, however, three cases filed in 1974 and relating to the Jamaican
expropriation of bauxite properties were settled by the parties. The
ICSID proceedings were discontinued. 6 On August 29, 1977, an award
was rendered in the case of Adriano-Gardella SpA v. Government of
Ivory Coast.7 Proceedings continue in the oldest case, Holiday Inns!
1 Ryans & Baker, The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 10 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 65 (1976).
2 INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, LIST OF CON-
TRACTING STATES AND OTHER SIGNATORIES OF THE CONVENTION (As of January 3, 1978),
ICSID/3/Rev. 23.
3 Amerasinghe, Dispute Settlement Machinery in Relations Between States and Multi-
national Enterprises - With Particular Reference to the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes, 11 INT'L LAW. 45, 48 (1977).
4 Amerasinghe, The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes and De-
velopment Through the Multinational Corporation, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 793, 798 (1976).
5 Ryans & Baker, supra note 1.
6 INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, ELEVENTH
ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1977); ICSID Press Release, January 3, 1978.
7 Press Release, supra note 6.
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Occidental Petroleum v. Government of Morocco. Registered on De-
cember 27, 1971, the case has been delayed by the death of one arbitrator
and the resignation of another.8
Current developments suggest that the Centre may be achieving
wider acceptability. During the last eighteen months, three new cases
have been registered with the Centre, including the first case brought by
a government against a private party. On October 5, 1976, the Govern-
ment of Gabon instituted arbitration proceedings against Societe
SERETE, S.A., a French corporation. The parties reached an amicable
agreement and the case was discontinued in 1977. The other two new
cases were filed in November and December 1977 by private investors
against the Government of the People's Republic of Congo. Both are still
pending. 9
During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1977, the Centre made further
progress in gaining visibility and acceptance of its programs. Three
bilateral treaties for the protection and promotion of foreign investments
were signed which provided for acceptance of the jurisdiction of the
Centre as a means of settling disputes. 10 Six such treaties entered
into force during the year. The Centre prepared two new volumes for
the loose-leaf service INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD-DEVELOPING
COUNTIES; the laws of forty-three countries have been published."'
While the Centre has made some progress in gaining the acceptance
of its facilities, it has been unable to induce any Latin American
nations to sign the Convention. The frequency of ex parte settlement
should not detract from the achievement of the Centre. Voluntary
settlement is always preferable to the making of an award. The Centre's
purpose is the settlement of investment disputes, and the limited results
now available indicate success in that goal.
-R.K.
LAW OF THE SEA - Proposed Federal Investment Guarantee
of Deep Seabed Mining Legislation, S. 2053, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977); H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
Debate in the U.S. Congress and in the Third Law of the Sea
Conference (in its seventh session) will continue on the subject of the
control and use of the resources of the sea. As developing and
industrialized countries argue without resolution over allocation of the
sea's resources, frustration may hasten national action in Washington
8 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 4.
9 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 5; Press Release, supra note 6.
10 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 5.
11 Id. at 20.
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on deep seabed mining legislation. Bills that would license and regulate
U.S. nationals in the mining of hard minerals on the ocean floor are
before both Houses of Congress.1 Unilateral action by the U.S. through
such legislation now has the support of the Carter administration largely
because the administration disapproves of the current trend in the Law
of the Sea Conference. However, the Carter administration objects to,
and the current debate in Congress centers on, investment guarantee by
the federal government to the companies participating in deep seabed
mining against the adverse effect any Law of the Sea treaty might have
on their operations.
The proposed legislation is currently moving through various
committees of both houses. 2 As the bills emerge from committee, their
common characteristics will be as follows: (1) the legislation is to be
interim in nature pending a Law of the Sea treaty; (2) the environment
must be protected through regulation and violation fines; (3) an invest-
ment fund must be set aside from the profits for the future benefit of the
international community; and (4) the concept of freedom of the high
seas is accepted, that is, the legislation is merely a licensing statute
which is in no way a claim of sovereignty by the United States over any
part of the high seas.
The bills vary in their provisions for investment insurance. Title II of
the version of the bill in the Senate Commerce Committee and Title I of
the version reported by the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee
of the House contain a provision providing investment insurance
or investment guarantee for deep sea mining adversely affected by
any international agreement into which the United States sub-
sequently enters. 3 Losses not compensated by the bills are those covered
by customary insurance, as well as acts of sabotage or terrorism, failure
of mining technology, variation in market value or claims with remedy
in admiralty law. 4 What is sought is "political" insurance against the
United States' changing by multi-lateral treaty the legal and political
environment under which the companies operate. The government will
guarantee a loss by a mining concern up to the lesser of 90% of actual
loss or $350,000,000. If a company has held a permit or license to mine
for ten years, no compensation will be allowed. A company wishing to
insure itself in this manner must pay a premium to the federal treasury
of between one quarter and three quarters of one percent of its
investment in the preceding calendar year.5
IS. 2053, 95th Cong., 1st SESS. (1977); H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 1st SESS. (1977)
[hereinafter cited by bill number and section]. (Similar or identical bills introduced in the
House are H.R. 3652, 4582, 4922, 5624, 6784, 6846).
2 Energy and Natural Resource, and Commerce Committees of the Senate; Merchant
Marine, Interior and International Relations Committees of the House.
3 S. 2053 § 202, H.R. 3350 § 13(a) as amended § 202.
4 See, e.g., H.R. 3350 § 20 2 (a).
- S. 2053 §§ 202(c)(2), (b)(2); H.R. 3350 § 202(e).
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The investment guarantee would benefit four international consor-
tia involving Lockheed, Kennecott Copper, U.S. Steel and International
Nickel (a Canadian-based corporation). 6 These companies assert they
cannot obtain the capital with which to begin and continue deep sea
mining.7 Testimony before congressional hearings on the legislation by
banking and insurance executives supports their contentions. It is im-
possible to insure commercially against a treaty,8 and, in order for a
financial institution to consider financing a venture such as deep seabed
mining, the venture would have to withstand an evaluation of risk fac-
tors. One necessary risk factor would be guaranteed tenure of the min-
ing company to the mining site or insurance in the event such tenure
were lost. 9
The failings of the Law of the Sea Conference are at the heart of
the problem. The need for investment guarantee arises from the
unstable nature of the Conference. The varied proposals emanating from
the factions in the Conference will doubtless involve some type of
international production control over U.S. companies. Control could
mean anything from royalty payment or revenue sharing to absolute
discretion wielded by an international body made up largely of those
whose interests would be contrary to those of the United States and its
mining companies. It is this threat which undercuts the ability of the
mining companies to obtain the needed capital. The mining company
solution is a compensation guarantee from the federal government
which would prevent an uncertain political situation from developing
in a way adverse to mining interests. The mining companies seek to
obtain the needed capital through insurance from the United States
government. 10
Opposition to the investment guarantee comes on several fronts. In
a close vote,11 the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee of the House
deleted the investment guarantee section from the bill. Among
the reasons given by the majority for rejecting the investment guarantee
6 H.R. REP. No. 95-588 (Part II), 95th Cong., 1st SESS. 67 (1977).
See, e.g., Proposed Deep Seabed Mining Legislation: Hearings of H.R. 3350 Before
the Subcomm. on Oceanography and the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 95th Cong., 1st SEss. 228 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearing Report].
8 H.R. REP. No. 95-588 (Part I), 95th Cong., 1st SESS. 20 (1977), Hearing Report, supra
note 7, at 223.
9 Id. at 20; Hearing Report, supra note 6, at 169.
10 The initial investment of each American company before any profit is about
$850,000,000 over ten years. See: H.R. REP. No. 95-588 (Part I), supra note 8, at 16.
11 22 to 18 on deletion and 21 to 20 on a proposed amendment raising the premium
paid by the mining companies. H.R. REP. No. 95-588 (Part I), supra note 8, at 17.
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were lack of proof of need for the minerals, 12 possible expense to the
U.S. taxpayer due to the high liability in the first years and lack of
precedent for such compensation. 13 The major opposition in the Interior
Committee, however, focused on the fact that investment guarantee
might harm or discourage a successful Law of the Sea treaty. With such
a provision, United States negotiators would be caught in the middle,
not wanting to occasion a loss to individual citizens or to the
government of the United States. The committee also noted that the
bill's guarantee provision would add fuel to the fire already started by
the act's implication that the United States was claiming sovereignty
over the oceans and engaging in twentieth century colonialism.14
In a reverse of its prior stance, the Carter administration decided to
support the deep seabed mining legislation, but without the investment
guarantee. The administration position is that unilateral United States
action through licensing and environmental regulation may be impetus
to compromise and action at the upcoming seventh session of the Law of
the Sea Conference. But the investment guarantees would ham-
string U.S. negotiators. 15 The administration wants a bargaining wedge
but at the same time does not want to split the Conference any more than
is possible.
The GAO report is generally critical of the legislation. It says the bill
turns on the heavily debated investment guarantee section without
properly addressing the environmental problems, the form of Federal
management and the foreign policy issues:
If U.S. private interests willingly undertake, under Federal license,
exploration and commercial recovery with knowledge that the U.S.
is currently negotiating an international agreement, we do not be-
lieve it necessary for the U.S. government to be responsible for
compensating the private interests for the financial consequences of
implementing the international agreement known to have been
under development.' 6
The administration and the minority report of the House Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Committee support the view that all parties - the
12 The minerals sought on the ocean floor are "manganese nodules" found in large
quantities beyond the national jurisdiction of any nation at a depth of about 2000 meters.
In composition, they are 24.2% maganese, 1% nickle, .35% cobalt and .5% copper. The
United States is dependent upon imports for 98% of its manganese, 7% of its nickle, 98%
of its cobalt, and 15% of its copper. In terms of national defense, manganese is 2, cobalt is
11 and nickle is 15 in supply vulnerability in the event of war. Hearing Report, supra note 7
at 410, 421; H.R. REP. 95-588 (Part II), supra note 6, at 14; H.R. REP. 95-588 (Part I), supra
note 8, at 13.
13 H.R. REP. 95-588 (Part I), supra note 8, at 17.
4 Id.; See also Hearings, supra note 7, at 181.
15 Deep Seabed Mining and the Law of the Sea: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
International Organizations of the Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st
SESS. 2 (1977).
16 General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Mines and Mining, 9-15-77 reprinted in H.R. RE'. 95-588 (Part I), supra note 8, at 33.
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mining industry, the United States, other industrial nations and the
developing countries - would be best served if the United States did
not go to the bargaining table at the Law of the Sea Conference with the
investment guarantees hanging over its head. A better position would
be for the United States to insist on "grandfather rights" or tenure at
deep sea mine sites existing at the ratification of any treaty. 17 Such a
position would protect mining interests and should be enough assur-
ance to investment concerns to supply the needed capital.
Miners need capital. Investors need a situation of acceptable risks.
The Law of the Sea Conferences negotiations give no assurances that
could provide the needed economic stability to permit investment. But
for the United States government to guarantee against the adverse ef-
fects of a multilateral Law of the Sea treaty detrimental to mining com-
panies will further divide the factions at the Law of the Sea Conference.
-K.K.
17 H.R. REP. 95-588 (Part II), supra note 6, at 64.
